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Introduction: What Can Archaeology Tell Us about the Mind? 
 
What can relics of the past tell us about the thoughts and beliefs of the people who 
invented and used them? Recent collaborations at the frontier of archaeology, 
anthropology, and cognitive science are culminating in speculative but nevertheless 
increasingly sophisticated efforts to unravel how modern human cognition came about. 
By considering objects within their archaeological context, we have begun to piece 
together something of the way of life of people who inhabited particular locales, which in 
turn reflects their underlying thought processes.  
 
Comparing data between different sites or time periods tells us something about the 
horizontal (within generation) or vertical (between generations) transmission of material 
culture. In addition to patterns of transmission of existing kinds of artifacts, we are also 
interested in novel artifacts that might be indicative of new cognitive abilities, belief 
structures, or levels of cooperation. An archaeological period marked by the sudden 
appearance of many kinds of new objects may suggest the onset of enhanced creative 
abilities. By corroborating archaeological findings with anthropological data (evidence of 
sudden change in the size or shape of the cranium, for example) with knowledge from 
cognitive science about how minds function, we can make educated guesses as to what 
kinds of underlying cognitive changes could be involved, and how the unique abilities of 
Homo sapiens arose. 
 
In this chapter, we consider three questions about human cognition that can be addressed 
through archaeological data: (1) How did human culture begin? (2) Where, when, and 
how did humans acquire the unique cognitive abilities of modern Homo sapiens? and (3) 
What role do artifacts play in the evolution of these cognitive abilities? 
 
(1) The Origin of Human Culture 
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The earliest known artifacts, referred to as Oldowan -- after Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania, 
where they were first found -- were simple stone tools, pointed at one end (Leakey 1971), 
and widely associated with Homo habilis, although it is possible that they were also used 
by late australopithecenes (de Baune 2004). The oldest of these Oldowan tools, from 
Kada Gona and Kada Hadar, date to approximately 2.5 million years ago (Semaw et al. 
1997). The earliest use of stone tools was probably to split fruits and nuts; "the moment 
when a hominin ...produced a cutting tool by using a thrusting percussion ...marks a break 
between our predecessors and the specifically human" (de Baune 2004:142). With sharp 
edges, Lower Palaeolithic tools could be used to sharpen wood implements and 
occasionally butcher small game. Using the sharp flakes associated with these tools, 
Homo habilis butchered animals for meat, as these tools are found in context with cut-
marked bones at the FLK Zinj site (1.75 Ma) in the Olduvai Gorge (Leakey 1971; Bunn 
and Kroll 1986). Although it has been debated whether they were scavenging, hunting, or 
“power scavenging” by scaring carnivores away (e.g., Binford 1977; 1983, 1988; Bunn 
and Kroll 1986; Selvaggio 1998), it is clear that these hominids were capable of acquiring 
the richer, more meat-rich portions of a kill (Bunn and Kroll 1986). This may have 
introduced a positive feedback cycle, in that meat eating, by allowing a smaller gut, 
provided metabolic support for a larger brain (Aiello and Wheeler 1995) which, in turn, 
would improve cognitive ability for group hunting using mental landscape maps, 
interpretation of visual clues such as animal tracks, and knowledge of predator behavior. 
 
With the arrival of Homo erectus by 1.8 Ma, we see sophisticated, task-specific stone 
hand axes, complex stable seasonal habitats, and long-distance hunting strategies 
involving large game. The size of the Homo erectus brain was approximately 1,000 cc, 
about 25% larger than that of Homo habilis, and 75% the cranial capacity of modern 
humans (Aiello 1996; Ruff et al. 1997; Lewin, 1999). By 1.6 Ma, Homo erectus had 
dispersed as far as Southeast Asia (Swisher et al. 1994), indicating the ability to migrate 
and adapt to vastly different climates (Cachel and Harris 1995; Walker and Leakey 1993; 
Anton and Swisher 2004). In Africa, West Asia, and Europe, Homo erectus carried the 
Aschulean handaxe, which was present by 1.4 Ma in Ethiopia (Asfaw et al. 1992). A do-
it-all tool that may even have had some function as a social status symbol (Kohn and 
Mithen 1999) these symmetrical biface tools probably required three stages of 
production, bifacial knapping, and considerable skill and spatial ability to achieve their 
final form. The handaxe persisted as a tool of choice for over a million years, spreading 
by 500 ka into Europe, where was it used by H. heidelbergensis until the Mousterian at 
about 200 ka. This period also marks the first solid evidence for controlled use of fire, by 
800 ka in the Levant (Goren-Inbar et al. 2004). A 400,000 year-old, fire-hardened 
wooden spear found at Schöningen, Germany (Thieme 1997) shows beyond doubt that 
Middle Pleistocene Homo were sophisticated big-game hunters (Dennell 1997). 
  
Cognitive Theories of How Culture Began 
 
By a half million years ago the complexity of Homo culture was already beyond that of 
any other species (Darwin 1871; Plotkin 1988). What got the ball rolling, enabling the 
process of enculturation to take hold? One suggestion is a theory of mind (Cheney and 
Seyfarth 1990; Premack and Woodruff 1978), which refers to the capacity to reason 
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about the mental states of others, such as interpreting the intentions of another through 
his/her actions. However, there is abundant evidence that many species are capable of 
social attribution and deception, indicating that theory of mind is not unique to humans 
(Heyes 1998). Moreover, the invention of tools, taming of fire, and conquering of new 
habitats could not have been achieved solely through enhanced social skills; it would 
have required enhanced mastery of the physical environment. 
  
Another suggestion is that culture arose due to onset of the capacity for imitation 
(Dugatkin 2001; Richerson and Boyd 1998). However, imitation is widespread among 
animals such as dolphins, dogs, primates, and birds (Bonner 1980; Byrne and Russon 
1998; Lynch and Baker 1994; Robert 1990; Smith 1977). Moreover there is no evidence, 
empirical or theoretical, that imitation-like social learning processes (or simple 
manipulations of them such as a bias to copy high prestige individuals) are sufficient for 
cultural evolution. To get the kind of adaptive modification and diversification of stable 
form found in culture (and biology) requires entities that possess an integrated, self-
modifying structure wherein changes to one part percolate to other parts with context-
sensitive effects, such that different structures can potentially result. Artifacts, habits, and 
other socially acquired elements of culture do not on their own possess such a structure. 
  
A third proposal is that Homo underwent a transition from an episodic mode of cognitive 
functioning to a mimetic mode (Donald 1991). The early hominid, functioning in the 
episodic mode, was sensitive to the significance of episodes, could encode them in 
memory, and coordinate appropriate responses, but not voluntarily access them 
independent of environmental cues. Thus awareness was dominated by what was 
happening in the present moment. Donald maintains that with encephalization (brain 
enlargement) Homo acquired the capacity for a ‘self-triggered recall and rehearsal loop’. 
which basically amounts to the capacity for a stream of thought in which one idea evokes 
another which evokes another and so forth recursively. This process, sometimes referred 
to by psychologists as representational redescription (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), allowed 
hominds to direct attention away from the external world toward internal thoughts, 
planned actions, or episodes encoded in memory, and access them at will. This gave rise 
to a mimetic mode of cognitive functioning. The term comes from the word ‘mime’ or 
‘pantomime’, and indeed Donald stresses onset of the ability to act out events that may 
have occurred in the past or could occur in the future. Thus the mimetic mind is able to 
not only escape the here and now, but through gesture facilitate a similar temporary 
escape from the present in other minds. This provided a way of sharing knowledge and 
experience without language, and may have been our earliest means of cultural 
transmission. Self-triggered thought also enabled hominids to evaluate and improve skills 
through repetition or rehearsal. 
  
The Underlying Memory Structure: Fine-grained Distributed Representations 
 
The mimetic mode rests heavily on the capacity to generate previous or imagined 
episodes or motor acts and adapt them to the present situation. How might it have come 
about, and why would it be enhanced by encephalization? To answer this we look briefly 
at the structure of memory. Episodes etched in memory are distributed across a cell 
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assembly (a bundle of brain cells) that contains many locations, and likewise, each 
location participates in the storage of many items. Thus the same memory locations get 
used and reused (neural re-entrance). Each memory location is sensitive to a range of 
subsymbolic microfeatures: primitive attributes of a stimulus or situation. This kind of 
architecture is said to be content-addressable because similar or related items activate, 
and get encoded in, overlapping memory regions. Now imagine a hominid observing 
various features of the landscape. Memory location A may respond preferentially to lines 
oriented at say 45 degrees from the horizontal, neighboring location B to lines at a 
slightly different angle, say 46 degrees, and so forth. However, although A responds 
maximally to lines of 45 degrees, it responds to a lesser degree to lines of 46 degrees. 
This kind of organization is referred to as coarse coding. Thus for example, location A 
participates in the storage of all those memories involving lines at close to 45 degrees, 
and a particular episode affects not just A but many other locations. We refer to this 
constellation of locations as the cognitive receptive field (CRF) for that episode. 
  
As brains size increased, CRFs became larger. This enables more fine-grained encoding 
of episodes in memory, which makes the memory more prone to self-triggered thought. 
Consider, for example, an episode that involves getting pricked by a thorny cactus. A 
small brain might encode this episode in terms of a few features (Figure 1a), such as 
perhaps the pain involved, and some recognizable feature such as its overall shape or 
color. This would aid avoidance of contact with this cactus in the future, and perhaps 
similar cacti. However, that would be the extent of this episode’s usefulness. A larger 
brain, though, might include in the CRF additional features (Figure 1b), such as the sharp 
point of the thorn. The encoding of an episode constituted by both pointed shape and torn 
flesh means that there is an association between these properties. Some time later, the 
need to kill prey may activate the memory locations involved in the encoding of torn 
flesh, leading to the retrieval of the entire episode, including the pointed shape, and 
thereby aid in the invention of a spear. Hence the transition from coarse coding, wherein 
episodes tend to be encoded separately, to fine-grained coding, whereby episodes overlap 
and can thereby be associated, may have brought the capacity for abstract relationships. 
Such relationships constitute the stepping stones via which abstract streams of thought 
occur  (through representational redescription), and by which an internal model of the 
world is acquired and thereafter honed as new information is continually integrated. 
Abstraction thereby imparts the capacity to reason about anything including, but not 
limited to, the mental states of others. 
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Figure	  1.	  (a)	  Schematic	  representation	  of	  activation	  of	  portion	  of	  (a)	  less	  fine-­‐grained	  memory,	  
left	  and	  (b)	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  memory,	  right.	  Each	  vertex	  represents	  a	  possible	  memory	  
location.	  Each	  black	  ring	  represents	  an	  actual	  location.	  Ring	  with	  circle	  inside	  represents	  actual	  
location	  with	  previously	  encoded	  item.	  Degree	  of	  whiteness	  indicates	  degree	  of	  activation	  in	  
current	  thought,	  which	  concerns	  the	  need	  to	  kill	  prey	  for	  food.	  	  
  
(2) Cognitive Modernity  
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The European archaeological record suggests that a profound cultural transition occurred 
between 60,000 and 30,000 ka at the onset of the Upper Paleolithic (Bar-Yosef 1994; 
Klein 1989a; Mellars 1973, 1989a, 1989b; Soffer 1994; Stringer and Gamble 1993). The 
Upper Paleolithic has often been referred to as a “revolution”. Considering it “evidence 
of the modern human mind at work,” Richard Leakey (1984:93-94) describes the Upper 
Palaeolithic as “unlike previous eras, when stasis dominated, ... [with] change being 
measured in millennia rather than hundreds of millennia.” Similarly, Mithen (1996) refers 
to the Upper Paleaolithic as the ‘big bang’ of human culture, exhibiting more innovation 
than in the previous six million years of human evolution. This marks the beginning of a 
more organized, strategic style of hunting involving specific animals at specific sites, 
elaborate burial sites indicative of ritual, the colonization of Australia, and replacement of 
Levallois tool technology by blade cores in the Near East. In Europe, many forms of art 
appeared, including naturalistic cave paintings of animals, decorated tools and pottery, 
bone and antler tools with engraved designs, ivory statues of animals and sea shells, and 
personal decoration such as beads, pendants, and perforated animal teeth, many of which 
may have indicated social status (White 1989a, 1989b). White (1982:176) also writes of a 
“total restructuring of social relations.” Clearly the Upper Palaeolithic was a period of 
unprecedented cultural change. Was it strictly a cultural explosion, or a major event in the 
biological evolution of our species? In either case, how and why did it happen? 
  
The Upper Palaeolithic as a Cultural Transition  
 
Although the tradition has been to view the Upper Palaeolithic transition as a 
“revolution,” a more appropriate null hypothesis might well be that it was not a 
“revolution” at all, and that Lower and Middle Palaeolithic symbolism should be 
reassessed without our modern expectations about iconography (Bednarik 1992). 
Henshilwood and Marean (2003) argue that many of the diagnostic traits (such as art, 
burial of the dead, personal ornaments, blade technology, complex hearths, and seasonal 
hunting in harsh environments) used to identify behavioral modernity are based on the 
European Palaeolithic record and lack relevance to African Stone Age. In fact, models 
being proposed for the gradual development of cognitive modernity well before the 
Upper Palaeolithic transition are substantially supported by archaeological evidence 
(Bahn 1991; Harrold 1992; Henshilwood and Marean 2003; White 1993; White et al. 
2003). McBrearty and Brooks (2000), for example, argue that most of the features 
associated with a rapid transition to behavioral modernity, at 40–50 ka in Europe, are 
actually found in the African Middle Stone Age tens of thousands of years earlier, 
including blades and microliths, bone tools, specialized hunting, long distance trade, art 
and decoration. Some important examples include the Berekhat Ram figurine from Israel 
(d’Errico and Nowell 2000), and an anthropomorphic figurine of quartzite from the 
Middle Ascheulian (ca. 400 ka) site of Tan-tan site in Morocco (Bednark 2003). 
  
If modern human behaviors were indeed gradually assembled as early as 250–300 ka, as 
McBrearty and Brooks (2000) argue, it would push these changes back into alignment 
with the most recent spurt in human brain enlargement, between 600,000 and 150,000 ka 
(Aiello 1996; Ruff et al. 1997), well before the Upper Paleolithic. Indeed, an earlier 
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cultural transition might be easier to explain if it coincided with an increase in brain size 
(Bickerton 1990; Mithen 1998).  
  
As Henshilwood and Marean (2003:630) point out, “there is no anatomical evidence (and 
there may never be any such evidence) for a highly advantageous neurological change 
after 50,000 years ago.” What can be gleaned from skeletal anatomy is that many modern 
behaviors were at least anotomically possible by earlier dates. For example, the hyoid 
bone (which connects to the larynx) of a Neanderthal from Kebara Cave (63,000 BP) 
indicates the anatomically capacity for language (Arensburg et. al. 1989), and the inner-
ear structures of Middle Pleistocene humans from the Sierra de Atapuerca (ca. 800 ka) is 
indicative of the capacity to hear language properly (Martinez et al. 2004). Based on 
skeletal anatomy, we cannot even rule out the possibility that Homo erectus used some 
sort of pre-syntactic vocal communication (Wynn 1998). 
  
From DNA evidence it now seems very likely, although not indisputable (Eswaran 2002; 
Wolpoff et al. 2004), that Neanderthals were a separate lineage and not the ancestors of 
modern humans (Caramelli et al. 2003; Krings et al. 1997; Ovchinnikov et al. 2000; 
Tattersall 1998). If Neanderthals possessed cognitive abilities on par with modern 
humans, it would suggest that their abilities evolved independently during their 500,000 
years of separate lineage from humans (Mithen 1996:141). Neanderthals had an average 
brain size of 1,520 cc (Klein 1989b:272), which is actually slightly larger than the 
modern human average. In Europe from 130 ka until at least 50 ka but possibly 30 ka 
(Klein 2003), Neanderthals survived glacial cycles with fluctuations in game populations, 
climate, and plants. Particularly in their hunting of large mammals (Marean and Kim 
1998), their knowledge of cave location, hoof prints, animal behavior, and potential 
carcass locations was essential to their survival.  
  
The technical intelligence of Neanderthals was considerable; the Levallois technique of 
tool making requires 5 stages and technical thinking throughout the process, such that a 
fixed set of rules would be insufficient to do it and even most students today can't learn to 
make a Levallois point (Mithen 1996). Neanderthal burials indicate that they at least 
occasionally buried their dead, and that the sick and elderly were cared for (Bahn 1998; 
Bar-Yosef et al. 1986; Klein 2003; Mithen 1996:135). As for an aesthetic sense, whether 
Neandethals were capable of art has become a hotly debated issue (e.g., Davidson 1992; 
D’Errico et al. 2003 and associated comments). Bednarik (1992) compiled a list of 
published evidence for pre-Upper Palaeolithic symbolic behavior, including the use of 
ochre or hematite, crystal prisms and fossils, perforated portable objects, engraved or 
notched bone fragments, and rock art. While some (Davidson 1992; Chase and Dibble 
1992) considered this evidence to be spread too sparsely over time and continents to 
show any convincing pattern, certain individual cases beg explanation, with the higher 
profile cases including the decorated bone from Bilzingsleben (see Mithen 1996:161), or 
the musical flute of bone from Divje Babe I cave (D’Errico et al. 1998b). 
  
More recently the debate has focused on whether Neanderthals are responsible for the 
Chatelperronian industry, which appears to be the early Upper Palaeolithic descendent of 
the Mousterian industry (Klein 1989b:335). The site of Grotte du Renne, Arcy-sur-Cure, 
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dated at about 34,000 BP, where a Neanderthal temporal bone (Hublin et al. 1996) is 
found near Chatelperronian artifacts, has become central to the debate over Neanderthal’s 
cognitive capacity for art and symbolism. Based on arguments of the archaeological 
context within the Grotte du Renne, d'Errico et al. (1998a, 2003) argued that the 
Chatelperronian ivory beads, pierced bear incisors and wolf canines, and ivory rings were 
made by Neanderthals, and made distinctively enough so as to not be mere imitations of 
Aurignacian ornaments made by contemporary modern humans. The Chatelperronian 
predates the oldest Aurignacian (both stratigraphically and in 14C) almost everywhere 
they are found (d’Errico et al. 2003; Klein 2003) and that the Chatelperronian lithics 
show stylistic continuity from the preceding Neanderthal Mousterian. If their argument is 
true, and the Neanderthals really did make simple bone tools, decorate themselves with 
perforated animal teeth, and put red ochre on their living floors, then their considerable 
cognitive capacities would require a reexamination of the causes of cognitive modernity 
(d’Errico et al. 2003; Mellars 1998b).  
  
It has been hypothesized that modernity arose at different times and places (Bahn 1998; 
Mellars 1998b), though this has become exceedingly unlikely on the basis of recent 
genetic evidence (Prugnolle et al. 2005). Another problem with this scenario is the 
apparently extraordinary coincidence that these Neanderthal behaviors would have begun 
just as modern humans were spreading into Europe (Demars 1998; Hublin 1998; Mellars 
1998a; 1998b; Toscano 1998). If Neanderthals survived in southern Iberia for 5,000 - 
10,000 years after the arrival of anatomically modern humans in northern Spain, it seems 
likely that they imitated the Aurignacian objects of the newcomers, possibly with some 
(intentional or unintentional) modification (Klein 2003). However, D’Errico et al. (2003) 
counter that the Iberian Neanderthals maintained their traditional culture long after 
modern humans arrived, indicating they were not simply acculturated through contact.  
  
Even if we accept biological ability for “modern” behaviors developed gradually over 
hundreds of thousands of years, the question remains about why the development in these 
behaviors accelerated at or after 60,000 BP. What is perhaps most impressive about this 
period is not the novelty of any particular artifact but that the overall pattern of cultural 
change is cumulative; more recent artifacts resemble older ones but have modifications 
that enhance their appearance or functionality. This is referred to as the ratchet effect 
(Tomasello 1993), and it appears to be uniquely human (Donald 1998). It may have 
involved an underlying biological change, as discussed in below. Note however that 
many dramatic cultural revolutions, such as the Holocene transition to agriculture or the 
modern Industrial Revolution, occurred long after the biological changes that made them 
cognitively possible. Thus all that can be said for certain is that by somewhere within the 
vicinity of 50,000 or more years ago, the hominid mind had not only had acquired the 
potential for cognitive modernity, but its environment (social, cultural, and physical) 
enabled it to capitalize on or actualize that potential.  
  
The Upper Paleolithic as an Event in the Biological Evolution of Cognition 
 
The traditional and currently dominant view is that modern behavior appeared in Africa 
between 50,000 and 40,000 years ago and then spread out of Africa from anatomically 
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modern humans who, through their biologically evolved cognitive advantages, replaced 
the pre-existing species, including the Neanderthals in Europe (e.g., Ambrose 1998; 
Gamble 1994; Klein 2003; Stringer and Gamble 1993). If so, what were these cognitive 
advantages, and how did they come together in the modern mind? Let us now review 
some explanations. 
  
Advent of syntactic language in modern humans 
 
While earlier Homo and even Neanderthals may have been capable of primitive 
language, the syntactic aspects appear to have emerged at the start of the Upper 
Palaeolithic (Aiello and Dunbar 1993; Bickerton 1990, 1996; Dunbar 1993, 1996). 
Syntax enabled language to become general-purpose, put to use in all kinds of situations, 
whereas previously it had been reserved for social situations. Carstairs-McCarthy (1999) 
presents a modified version of this proposal, suggesting that although some form of 
syntax was present in the earliest languages, most of the later elaboration, including 
recursive embedding of syntactic structure, emerged in the Upper Paleolithic. Another 
proposal is that at this time humans underwent a transition from a predominantly gestural 
to vocal form of communication (Corballis 2002). It is indeed possible that the syntactic 
elements of language emerged at this time, and language can transform cognition 
(Tomasello 1999). However, we are still left with the question of what made possible the 
kind of complex thought processes that sophisticated language requires. Furthermore, we 
may never know exactly when syntactic language began, due the ambiguity of the 
archaeological evidence. (Bednarik (1992:30), for example, refer to Davidson and 
Noble’s (1989) argument on the cognitive origins of language and iconic graphic art “a 
house of cards” with no supporting evidence.)  
  
Connection of domain-specific modules: The notion that the mind is modular refers to the 
view that many cognitive functions are served by innately channeled domain-specific 
systems, whose operations are largely independent of and inaccessible to the rest of the 
mind (Fodor, 1983). It has been suggested that what might appear to be unequivocal 
evidence of modernity might merely reflect the evolution of cognitive competence 
restricted to particular domains governed by particular modules (e.g. Renfrew and 
Zubrow, 1994). Another proposal is that modern cognition arose through the connecting 
of domain-specific brain modules, enabling cross-domain thinking, and particularly 
analogies and metaphors (Gardner, 1983; Rozin, 1976). Mithen (1996) suggests that in 
the Upper Paleolithic, modules specialized to cope with domains such as natural history, 
technology, and social processes became connected, giving rise to conceptual fluidity. 
One problem with this proposal is that although there is evidence that certain abilities are 
handled by different modules (e.g. different brain areas specialized for, say, vision and 
speech), there is no evidence that different modules handle different domains of life e.g. 
no religion module or tool module. Moreover, the logistics of physically connecting these 
modules (whose positions in the brain evolved without foreknowledge that they should 
one day become connected) would be formidable.  
  
Sperber’s (1994) solution is that the modules got connected not directly, but indirectly, 
by way of a special module, the ‘module of meta-representation’ or MMR, which 
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contains ‘concepts of concepts’. Sperber’s proposal is consistent with there being more 
general purpose or ‘association cortex’ by the onset of the Upper Palaeolithic, although 
the timing of this cultural transition does not coincide with the increase in cranium size.  
  
Symbolic Reasoning: Deacon (1997) has suggested that the Upper Paleaolithic 
‘revolution’ was due to the emergence of an ability to represent complex, internally 
coherent abstract systems of meaning, consisting of representations and their properties 
and relationships. Some of these are grounded in concrete experience, but many are 
instead processes of systematic abstraction or symbolic reasoning. Thus Deacon’s 
account focuses on the ability to systematically reason with abstract symbols and thereby 
derive causal relationships. It does not deal with the intuitive, analogical, associative 
processes through which we unearth relationships of correlation. 
  
Cognitive Fluidity: In contrast, Mithen (1998) proposes that the cultural transition of the 
Middle/Upper Paleolithic reflects enhanced cognitive fluidity, resulting in the ability to 
map, explore, and transform conceptual spaces. Mithen refers to Boden’s (1990) 
definition of a conceptual space as a ‘style of thinking—in music, sculpture, 
choreography, chemistry, etc.’ As for why hominids suddenly became good at 
transforming conceptual spaces, he is rather vague: 
  
There is unlikely to be one single change in the human mind that enabled 
conceptual spaces to become explored and transformed. Although creative 
thinking seems to appear suddenly in human evolution, its cognitive basis had a 
long evolutionary history during which the three foundations evolved on largely 
an independent basis: a theory of mind, a capacity for language, and a complex 
material culture. After 50,000 years ago, these came to form the potent 
ingredients of a cognitive/social/material mix that did indeed lead to a creative 
explosion (Mithen 1998:186).  
  
Although the capacity for a theory of mind, language, and complex artifacts could 
conceivably have arisen at different times, it is hard to imagine how each could have 
evolved independently. It is possible they have a common cause fact; a single, small 
change within a complex interconnected system can have enormous consequences (Bak 
et al. 1988; see also chapter 15 of this volume by Bentley and Maschner). The possibility 
that the Upper Paleolithic revolution was triggered by a small cognitive change is 
consistent with scientific understanding of abrupt phase transitions and with the sudden 
‘breakthroughs’ that appear in the archeological record back to the Lower Palaeolithic (de 
Baune 2004; Tattersall 2003). However, Mithen’s basic point—that it is related to the 
capacity to explore and transform conceptual spaces—holds promise. A similar proposal 
is that it was due to onset of the capacity to blend concepts, which greatly facilitated the 
weaving of experiences into stories or parables (Fauconnier and Turner 2002). The 
question we are left with is: what sort of change in cognitive functioning would enhance 
the blending of concepts and exploration of conceptual spaces? 
  
Contextual focus: The above proposals for what kind of cognitive change could have led 
to the Upper Paleolithic transition stress different aspects of cognitive modernity. 
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Acknowledging a possible seed of truth in each of them we begin to converge toward a 
common (if more complex) view. Conceptual blending is characteristic of associative 
thought, which is quite different from the logical, analytic thought stressed by Deacon. 
The modern human mind excels at both. Hence the Paleolithic transition may reflect a 
fine-tuning of the genetics underlying the capacity to subconsciously shift between these 
modes, depending on the situation, by varying the specificity of the activated cognitive 
receptive field (Gabora 2003). This is referred to as contextual focus1[2] because it 
requires the ability to focus or defocus attention in response to the situation or context. 
Defocused attention, by diffusely activating a diversity of memory locations, is 
conducive to associative thought; obscure (but potentially relevant) properties of the 
situation thus come into play (Figure 2a). Focused attention is conducive to analytic 
thought because memory activation is constrained enough to zero-in and specifically 
operate on the most defining properties (Figure 2b). Thus in an analytic mode of thought, 
the concept ‘giant’ might only activate the specific concept of bigness, whereas in an 
associative mode of thought, the giants of various fairytales might come to mind. Once it 
was possible to shift between these modes of thought, cognitive processes requiring 
either analytic thought (e.g. mathematical derivation), associative thought (e.g. poetry) or 
both (e.g., technological invention) could be carried out more effectively. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In neural net terms, contextual focus amounts to the capacity to spontaneously and 
subconsciously vary the shape of the activation function, flat for associative thought and spiky for 
analytical. 
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Figure 2. (a) Schematic representation of region of memory activated and retrieved from 
during (a) associative thought, left and (b) analytic thought, right. The activation function 
is flat in associative thought and spiky in analytic thought. Encoded items in memory 
locations in whitened region blend to generate next instant of thought. 
  
When we take into account how memory works, the lag between the second rapid 
increase in brain size approximately 500,000 years ago, and the cognitive transition of the 
Upper Paleolithic begins to make sense. A larger brain provided more space for episodes 
to be encoded, but it doesn’t follow that this increased space could straightaway be 
optimally navigated. There is no reason to expect that information from different domains 
would immediately be compatible enough to coexist in a stream of thought, as in the 
production of a metaphor. It is reasonable that once the brain achieved sufficient capacity 
for modern cognition, it took time to fine-tune how its components ‘talk’ to each other 
such that different items could be blended together and recursively revised (and recoded) 
in a coordinated manner. Only then could the full potential of the large brain be realized. 
Thus the bottleneck may not have been sufficient brain size but sufficient sophistication 
in the use of the memory already available, which could have come about through onset 
of contextual focus. With it the modern mind could both (1) intuitively combine 
concepts, and adapt old concepts to new contexts, and (2) logically analyze these new 
representations and how they fit together. Together these abilities would lead to the 
development of more fine-grained internal model of the world, which through language 
could be expressed and revised. Hence it may not be language per se that made the 
difference, as Bickerton (1990, 1996) maintained, but rather capacity to shift between 
analytic and associative processing --- such that the fruits of one mode provide the 
ingredients for the other --- that not only made language possible, but other aspects of the 
cultural life of modern humans such as art, science, and religion as well.  
 
(3) Minds, Artifacts, and Evolution 
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The cumulative nature of artifact change since the Middle Paleolithic tempts one to refer 
to culture as an evolution process. Like organisms, artifacts become more complex, more 
finely honed, and more adapted to the constraints and affordances they impose on one 
another over time. They also create niches for one another; for example, the invention of 
cars created niches for seatbelts and gas stations. However, artifacts do not evolve by 
means of a genetic code, and do not change through a process of random mutation and 
natural selection. So culture does not evolve in the same sense as biological organisms. In 
this section we examine in what sense the word evolution applies to artifact change. 
  
Evolutionary Archaeology 
 
As discussed by Bentley and Maschner in chapter 10 of this volume, “evolutionary 
archaeology” (EA) is one school among an array of evolutionary approaches that attempt 
to analyze culture change in terms of concepts borrowed from population genetics such 
as selection or drift -- changes in the relative frequencies of variants through random 
sampling from a finite population (O’Brien 1996, 2005; O’Brien and Lyman; for 
critiques see Boone and Smith, 1998; Gabora, 2006). EA distinguishes itself from other 
evolutionary approaches by its strong maintenance that artifacts constitute part of an 
organism’s phenotype (defined in biology as the physical manifestation of an organism’s 
genotype) and should be subjected to the same kind of analysis as other phenotypic traits. 
O’Brien and Lyman (2004: 179) see human artifacts as phenotypic in the biological 
sense, analogous to “a bird’s next, a beaver’s dam, or a chimpanzee’s twig tools as 
phenotypic traits.” However, their assumption, that heritable behavior is the major 
determinant in the form of a human-made artifact, is rather easily falsified. Colin 
Renfrew (1982) succinctly characterized the difference between adaptations that are 
accumulated genetically and adaptations that are passed on culturally: 
  
The genetic inheritance, itself the product of environmental selection, may itself be 
regarded as environmental ‘memory’... humans [are not] alone in communicating 
[their experience of the environment] to others of the species: the dance of the bees, 
where individuals can indicate the direction and distance of suitable supplies of 
pollen, fulfils precisely this function. The essence of human culture, however, is 
that it is an ‘acquired characteristic’, which, unlike the dance of the bees, is not 
genetically determined (Renfrew 1982:18). 
  
As Renfrew points out, much of human culture is not genetically determined, meaning 
that it can evolve in a Lamarckian fashion by inheriting acquired characteristics. Beaver 
dams and bird’s nests, however, cannot evolve this way: if a particular beaver were 
taught, perhaps by humans, to build a window in its dam, and its offspring still built 
normal windowless dams, we would see that only the dam, and not the window, belongs 
in the beaver’s biological phenotype, to be passed on via genetic inheritance. 
  
Do Artifacts Evolve? 
 
Culture has many attributes of an evolutionary process. That is, phenomena such as 
transmission and drift can operate on cultural variants themselves regardless of the 
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Darwinian (genetic) evolution among humans who carry these variants. In computer 
simulations (see Costopolous, chapter 16 of this volume), culture evolves through drift or 
a combination of invention and imitation, without genomes at all (e.g., Gabora 1995; 
Neiman 1995; Madsen et al. 1999; Bentley et al. 2004). But although culture has 
attributes of an evolutionary process, it does not operate through the same underlying 
mechanisms as biology. When it comes to human-made artifacts, inheritance of acquired 
characteristics is not just the exception but the rule. Once we learned how to build 
dwellings with windows, dwellings with windows were here to stay. Something is 
happening through culture that is prohibited in biology.  
 
Some cultural theorists assume that the basic units of this second evolution process are 
mental representations or ideas, or the tangible products that result from them such as 
artifacts, language and so forth (Aunger, 2000; Durham, 1991; Lake, 1998). Sometimes 
these elements of culture are referred to as ‘memes’, a term that usually implies that they 
are not only basic elements of culture but also replicators: entities that make copies of 
themselves (Dawkins 1976). What does that entail? The mathematician and computer 
scientist John von Neumann (1966) postulated that a replicator, or ‘self-replicating 
automaton,’ could be code consisting of (1) a description of itself, or self-description, and 
(2) a set of self-assembly instructions. After it is passively copied from one replicant, the 
self-description is actively deciphered via the self-assembly instructions to build the next 
replicant. In this case, the code functions as interpreted information. Interpreting the code 
makes a body, while the uninterpreted use of the code makes something that can itself 
make a body. In biology, the DNA code is copied—without interpretation—to produce 
new strands of DNA during meiosis. In successful gametes these DNA strands are 
decoded—interpreted—to synthesize the proteins necessary to construct a body. 
However, an artifact (or idea) is not a replicator because it does not consist of self-
assembly instructions. It may retain structure as it passes from one individual to another. 
But it does not replicate it. Like a broadcast signal received by a radio, an idea has no 
self-assembly code and needs external apparatus to be replicated – it cannot self-replicate 
in the biological sense. Thus the meme perspective is widely believed to be flawed. 
 
Essentially assuming that von Neumann’s definition holds for cultural information, Lake 
(1998) differentiates between its expression versus its symbolically coded representation. 
Speaking aloud or singing, for example, both express what is represented by a text or 
written musical score. Singing expresses what can be represented by written music. 
However neither expression nor representation is equivalent to interpretation or 
(uninterpreted) copying of a self-assembly code. A musical score does not, on its own, 
produce little copies of itself. Symbolic coding is not enough to be a replicator; there 
must be a coded representation of the self. In sum then, artifacts are not replicators and 
not the basic unit of an evolutionary process. 
 
Mind as primitive replicator 
This does not mean however that nothing in culture is a replicator. Another possibility is 
that the modern mind itself constitutes a replicator. Not a von Neumann replicator, which 
replicates with high fidelity using self-assembly instructions as described above, but a 
primitive replicator (Gabora 2004), which replicates in an autopoietic sense.An 
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autopoietic structure is one in which the parts reconstitute one another and thus the 
structure as a whole is self-mending or self-replicating. For example, Kauffman (1993) 
proposed that the earliest life forms were autopoietic; that is, that pre-DNA life initially 
replicated through a process in which simple molecules each catalyze the reaction that 
generates some other molecule in the set and thus as a whole they self-replicate. The 
proposal arose in response to the well-known ‘chicken and egg’ problem: which came 
first, the nucleotides that make up a genetic self-assembly code which through 
transcription and translation leads to proteins, or the proteins that are necessary to many 
stages of the transcription/translation process? His answer is neither; a sloppy form of 
self-replication is possible without any code. 
 
Kauffman’s proposal draws upon the topological notion of a closure space: a set of points 
sufficiently connected such that it is possible to get from any one point to another by 
following the edges (connections) between them. Closure can be visualized as follows. 
Imagine you spill a jar full of buttons on the floor. You tie two randomly chosen buttons 
with a thread, and repeat this again and again. Occasionally you lift a button and see how 
many connected buttons get lifted, and you find that clusters start to emerge. When the 
ratio of strings to buttons reaches about 0.5, you pass a threshold where, suddenly, a giant 
cluster of connected buttons forms, containing most of the buttons. The giant cluster is a 
closure space because any two buttons within it are connected through strings and other 
buttons. With primitive replicators the chicken-and-egg problem is solved because self-
replication occurs through happenstance interactions of molecules more primitive than 
either DNA or proteins. Since replication proceeds not through following a code but 
through happenstance interactions, inheritance of acquired characteristics is possible, and 
replication has a low fidelity because of it. 
 
Similarly, it is proposed that the enculturated modern human mind constitutes a primitive 
replicator that emerges through a self-organized process of conceptual closure (Gabora, 
2000; Gabora and Aerts 2005). Indeed an analogous paradox arises in considerations of 
the origin of cultural evolution as arose in consideration of the origin of biological 
evolution. We know that a mind is not just a collection of imitated cultural elements but 
an integrated model of how different aspects of experience relate to one another, or 
worldview. But this leads to the following chicken-and-egg situation: Until memories are 
woven into a worldview, how can they generate the remindings and associations that 
constitute a stream of thought? Conversely, until a mind can generate streams of thought, 
how does it integrate memories into a worldview? How could something composed of 
complex, mutually dependent parts come to be? 
 
Much as in biology, the chicken-and-egg paradox can be resolved by applying the 
concept of closure. To apply the concept of closure to cognition, episodes in memory are 
represented as points (buttons), associative paths between them as edges (strings), and 
concepts as clusters of connected points. Retrieval of an item from memory evokes 
another retrieval, which, in turn, evokes yet another. This increases the density of 
associative paths, and the probability of concept formation. Concepts facilitate streams of 
thought, which forge connections between more distantly related clusters. The ratio of 
associative paths to concepts increases until it becomes almost inevitable that a giant 
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cluster emerges and the episodes form a connected closure space. Eventually for any one 
episode or concept there exists a possible associative path to any other, and together they 
constitute an integrated conceptual web.  
 
The idea is that, like the self-organized autocatalytic sets postulated to be the earliest 
forms of life, a mind reach a stage in which it is conceptually integrated when it becomes 
a primitive replicator. Integrated structure enables it to reason about one thing in terms of 
another, adapt ideas to new circumstances, frame new experiences in terms of previous 
ones, or combine information from different domains (as what happens with a joke). It 
should be stressed that it is not the presence of but the capacity for an integrated 
worldview that the human species came to possess. An infant may be born predisposed 
toward conceptual integration, but the process must begin anew in each young mind. The 
manner in which a worldview replicates is not all-at-once but piecemeal, through social 
exchange, often mediated by artifacts. Worldviews are therefore not so much replaced by 
as transformed into (literally) more evolved ones. Like cutting a fruit at different angles 
exposes different parts of its interior, different situations expose different facets of a 
mind, and the production of artifacts is one way a mind reveals its current evolutionary 
state. The process is emergent rather than dictated by self-assembly instructions, and 
therefore characteristics acquired over a lifetime are heritable. One individual modifies 
the basic idea of a cup by giving it a flat enough bottom to stay put when not in use, and 
another individual adds a handle, making it easier to grasp. With each instantiation, the 
basic idea remains the same but the details change to make it more useful or adapted to 
specific needs.  
 
Thus while brains were evolving through biological evolution, integrated minds began 
evolving through cultural evolution. The associative or relational structure of the mind 
manifests as a capacity to define one element in terms of others, predict how a change to 
one element will affect another, compare the present state of an idea or artifact with its 
previous state, or desired state, and thereby refine or improve it. Two necessary steps 
toward conceptual closure would have been (1) that representations were sufficiently 
distributed to allow concept formation and self-cued retrieval, and (2) that contextual 
focus enabled the capacity to shift between associative thought (conducive to bridging 
domains) and analytical thought (conducive to logical operations within a domain). Thus 
the notion of conceptual closure fits well with the explanations put forth to underlie the 
two cultural transitions examined earlier, though at present this is speculative.  
 
Artifacts and the Extended Mind 
 
In contradiction to the meme perspective, neither a painting nor the ideas that went 
through the artist’s mind while painting it constitute a replicator. Instead, a painting 
reveals some aspect of the artist’s mind (which is a primitive replicator) and thereby 
affects the minds (other replicators) of those who admire it. As minds become 
increasingly complex, the artifacts they manifest become increasingly complex, which 
necessitates even more complex cognitive structure, et cetera. This suggests that artifacts 
are not the basic unit of either biological or cultural evolution, but that they a crucial if 
indirect role in the evolution of the integrated mind. 
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As Renfrew (1982) suggests, artifacts function as external memory storage, which affects 
both the biological and cultural fitness of their makers and users (see also Donald 1991, 
2001). Retrieving information from the depiction of bison on a cave wall or calendrical 
notches in a log is not so different from retrieving knowledge from memory. Note that 
elements of the natural world functioned as a form of memory long before there were 
symbolic artifacts; a look of disapproval on a mother’s face could remind a child not to 
eat a poisonous mushroom as readily as retrieval of a memory of doing this and getting 
sick. The look on the mother’s face is not a material artifact, yet it functions as an 
external memory source, in much the same way as notches in a log. This corresponds to 
Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) extended mind perspective, in which individual experience is 
woven together through interaction between the internal and external world, and in which 
the brain and its social cultural environment co-evolve, mutually provoking change in 
one another (Deacon, 1997; Durham, 1991; Lumsden and Wilson, 1981).  
 
Conclusions 
 
There are many ways in which human cognition differs from that of other species, such 
as our ability to generate and understand complex languages and other symbolic 
structures appearing in art, science, politics, and religion. The appearance of stone tools 
(2.5 Ma), strategic big game hunting (1.6 Ma), controlled fire use (0.8 Ma), and complex 
habitats suggests that prior to the onset of complex language and symbolism, hominid 
cognition already differed profoundly from that of other species. It has been suggested 
that this reflects onset of the capacity to imitate, or onset of a theory of mind enabling 
attribution of mental states to others. However, since these abilities are also present in 
other social species, a more likely suggestion is that it reflects onset of the capacity for 
self-triggering of thoughts or motor patterns such that one evokes the next. This underlies 
abilities ranging from refinement of skills for tool production to enactment of events. A 
plausible explanation for how it came about is that encephalization enabled mental 
representations of events and skills to become more broadly distributed and thus the 
resulting memory was more fine-grained, facilitating the retrieval or reminding events 
that recursively reiterated constitute a self-triggered thought process.  
 
Many, but not all, archaeologists believe that these distinctly human abilities likely arose 
about fifty thousand years ago, or perhaps somewhat earlier, during the Middle/Upper 
Paleolithic. Although encephalization has been occurring throughout the last two million 
years, a second spurt occurred between 600,000 and 150,000 ka, well before the cultural 
transition of the Middle/Upper Paleolithic. Thus this second cultural transition cannot be 
attributed to something so simple as the sudden appearance of a ‘language module’; a 
feasible explanation must involve not new brain parts or increased memory but a more 
sophisticated way of using the available memory. The advent of language or symbol use 
may be part of the answer, but begs the question what sort of cognitive functioning is 
capable of producing and using language or symbols. A more in-depth examination of 
spatiotemporal patterns in the archaeological record, however, reveals not just the 
pronounced appearance symbolic artifacts, but evidence that they build on one another in 
cumulative fashion; that is, exhibit the ratchet effect. Indeed some believe this to be the 
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most distinctly human characteristic of all. It is indicative of conceptual fluidity, which 
involves combining ideas in new ways and adapting old ideas to new circumstances, and 
requires both the complex mental operations characteristic of analytic thought, and the 
intuitive, analogical processes characteristic of associative thought. Thus it has been 
proposed that culture was brought about by onset of the capacity to adapt others' ideas to 
ones' own circumstances, and this requires (1) an integrated internal model of the world, 
and (2) a sophisticated way of navigating that model of the world, such that relationships 
can be retrieved and creatively elaborated. This provides a possible cognitive explanation 
for the explosion of task-specific decorated tools, beads, pottery, and so forth during the 
Middle/Upper Paleolithic: they reflect onset of the capacity to spontaneously shift 
between these two forms of thought depending on the situation. Together, analytical 
thought allowing calculation within a domain, and associative thought forging 
connections amongst seemingly disparate domains. This paved the way for episodes 
encoded in memory to become integrated through the formation of a dynamical network 
of concepts to yield a self-modifying internal model of the world. 
 
The last section of this chapter looked at the relationship between minds, artifacts, and 
evolution. Evolutionary archaeologists view artifacts as part of the human phenotype, 
which increase biological fitness through their functionality. However we saw that 
although there may be a genetic component to the capacity to produce a well-crafted 
artifact it is not the only or even dominant influence; culture appears to play a formidable 
role. We also saw that artifacts themselves do not constitute replicators, and are thus not 
the basic unit of a cultural evolution process. However it is possible that integrated 
worldviews evolve in the same primitive sense as the first living organisms, through an 
emergent, self-organized process, resulting in a structure that can be mathematically 
described as a closure structure. Because no self-assembly code is involved, the evolution 
of such emergent structures is Lamarckian; acquired characteristics are inherited. 
 
In this brief chapter it has been possible only to sketch out some ideas about the evolution 
of human cognitive abilities. We have a long way to go before we arrive at a complete 
picture, but it is an exciting journey ahead. 
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